Logical Pluralism

Catarina Dutilh Novaes

Institute for Logic, Language and Computation
Amsterdam - The Netherlands

Ole Hjortland

Department of Philosophy
University of StAndrews - Scotland

        ole                              catarina






References

J. Y. Béziau, ‘Universal Logic’. In T. Childers & O. Majer (eds), Logica'94 -- Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium, Philosophia, Prague, pp. 73-93.

JC Beall and G. Restall, Logical Pluralism. OUP, 2006.

S. Haack, Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

G. Priest, Doubt Truth to Be a Liar. OUP, 2006 (ch. 12). 

G. Restall, 'Carnap's Tolerance, Meaning, and Logical Pluralism, Journal of Philosophy, 99(8): 426-443, 2002.



Description of the content of the tutorial:

Up until the end of the 19th century, logic was typically seen as the art and science of correct reasoning, and in this sense it was not specific to any discipline or subject-matter (i.e. logic was seen as topic-neutral); moreover, even if there might have been competing systems, the general opinion was that there should be only one true logic. True enough, at different times the scope of logic went very much beyond correct reasoning in the sense of drawing inferences strictly speaking: in the Latin medieval period, for example, what we now call semantics and much of what we now call epistemology also belonged to the realm of logic. Still, even though there were different logical theories for different applications, when it came to reasoning, syllogistic inference remained the canon of correct reasoning for almost 2.500 years. 

A bit over a century later, the status of logic as a discipline has changed dramatically: we now have different logics, specially designed for certain situations, topics or tasks – what one could describe as a situation of ‘logical plurality’ – and the idea that there is only one correct way of reasoning and thus only one correct logic is no longer unanimously accepted – what is now referred to as the position of 'logical pluralism'. In this context, a universal logic seems to be a welcome development: it should allow for the comparison between systems, and for the arbitration of the disputes between competing systems. However, this contemporary plethora gives rise to certain philosophical questions concerning logical pluralism and universality, in particular the kind of universality claimed by universal logic. The tutorial will look at logical pluralism against the background of the history of logic, and tie it to the recent debate started by Beall and Restall's book Logical Pluralism (2006, OUP). We will then look at a number of reactions to logical pluralism in the literature, and try to connect some of the questions to the project of Universal Logic. 
 

Session (1) The Emergence of Logical Plurality and Logical Pluralism 

Session (2) Contemporary Logical Pluralism 

Session (3) Reactions to Logical Pluralism