Reflections on Paraconsistency
(University of Milan, Italy)
(Paderborn University, Germany)
Paraconsistent logics form a lively sector of the discipline we call
Philosophical Logic. The idea that contradictions are – in some cases or in some
way – acceptable without «explosion» of our rational systems has been developed
by paraconsistent logicians also with reference to epistemological and
metaphysical implications, and there is a wide literature on the theme. However,
the arising of contradictions, and the need of coming to terms with them, has
also ethical, political and more generally practical implications that sometimes
fade into the background.
Not only that, one of the main problem of paraconsistency (but this is true
also of other fields, like modal logic) is that on the one hand there
are philosophically oriented works with a weak or no technical part and vice
versa: some technical paraconsistent works have no consideration for the
philosophical aspects of the theme.
One aim of our workshop is thus to promote interaction between technical
and non-technical works in the field. A second but not secondary aim is to
enlarge the view, involving people interested in contradictions, but not
exclusively as militant logicians.
We thus encourage contributions able to suggest and treat preliminary
questions, sometimes underrated or not extensively studied by logicians, such as
1. In metaphysical and truth-theoretic perspective:
- A contradiction is the joined occurrence of two states of affairs that in
principle cannot jointly occur: what do we mean by ‘joint occurrence’ in this
- Are there contradictory truthmakers? If there are, are they to be intended as
two overlapping facts, or only one fact?
- If the acceptance of contradictions is ruled by truth (as dialetheists hold),
can we really renounce the classical exclusive notion of ‘T’, in virtue of which if
‘p’ is true then ‘not p’ must be false?
2. In epistemological perspective:
- Do we really believe the unbelievable?
- What kinds of epistemic gluts are rationally acceptable?
María del Rosario -
Jonas Becker Arenhart -
UNAM, Mexico - Washington University St Louis, USA
UFSC, Florianópolis, Brazil - University of Albany, USA
3. In ethical and generally practical perspective: - Disagreements and dilemmas are typical contexts in which the occurring of
contradictions has political consequences: how can we use the theories of
paraconsistent logicians to deal with these occurrences?
- Is Orwell’s analysis of the contradictory language of power (the newspeak)
still appropriate, nowadays, face to the positive «explosion» of communication
produced by our «information era»?
4. In meta-theoretical perspective:
- Why do we study contradictions? What normative conclusions can be drawn
from our theoretical efforts on this issue?
- What can we learn from the history of paraconsistency?
- Is ‘philosophy’ as such the enterprise that aims at solving or interpreting
contradictions, as many authors in the tradition held (see Hegel or Wittgenstein)?
Call for papers
We invite contributions on all aspects of paraconsistency and contradiction. Topics include:
paraconsistent systems: respective costs and benefits
gaps, gluts, and other truth values
what's so bad about trivialism?
the unbelievable: its role and believability
contradictions, discussive conflicts, and dilemmas
paradoxes in logic and elsewhere
what can the historical treatments of contradictions (in Aristotle, Pascal, Hegel, Bergson, etc.) still teach us?
was Hegel paraconsistentist?
what was really Aristotle's attitude toward contradictions?
old and new theories about the square of oppositions
the philosophical relevance of dialetheism and of other paraconsistent views
the political relevance of the philosophy of contradiction
Abstracts (one page) should be sent by November 15, 2017 via e-mail to:
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