This tutorial will try to contribute to ongoing discussions concerning relationship between (formal) logic and argumentation theory, still sometimes referred to as informal logic, different approaches within argumentation theory and normative role of agreement in argumentation.

1. On informal and formal logic once and again
Although still used by many to refer to normative study of arguments and argumentation different from that of (formal) logic, term 'informal logic' does not refer to one approach, but

'rather a collection of attempts to develop and theoretically justify a method for the analysis and evaluation of natural language arguments in different contexts of use that is an alternative to formal logic' (Van Eemeren, F.H. et al. 2014)

Further, these different approaches are nowadays considered to be a part of argumentation theory, an established study of argumentation from both the descriptive and normative points of view. Nowadays both arguments and argumentation are recognized as its proper objects of study. Its historical background is traced to dissatisfaction with standards of (formal) logic in analysis, evaluation and production of good arguments, especially in context of everyday argumentation. Session 1 will address reasons of disappointment in (formal) logic and high expectations of it.

2. Standard function of argumentation
In Session 2 main approaches within argumentation theory will be discussed, along the lines of (i) what they consider to be the central aim (main purpose, standard function) of argumentation and (ii) the relations of dependence they set between their respective theory of argument and theory of argumentation.

Contemporary argumentation theory is dominated by Pragmadialectics, a consensualist theory of argumentation according to which the aim of argumentation is to eliminate or resolve a difference of (expressed) opinion, i. e. reaching consensus as opposed to mere compromise. It has set as its central task the development of rules for rational discussion. Contrary to Pragmadialectics, epistemological theories of argumentation are based upon what they consider to be a conceptual truth about arguments, which states that the standard output of argumentation is knowledge or justified belief in the epistemological sense.

Compatibility of two aproaches will be considered on grounds of emphasis on argument (epistemological theories) vs. argumentation (Pragmadialectics) as central object of their study.

3. Agreement
Session 3 will continue discussion started in the previous session concerning problems with (unqualified) consensus and agreement as aim of argumentation. Consequences of epistemological concerns with rational (dis)agreement for argumentation theory will be considered, examining thesis that argumentation theory is applied social epistemology.

Bibliography

Lumer, Ch. (2005a). The Epistemological Theory of Argument-How and Why? Informal Logic 25: 213-243.

Lumer, Ch. (2010). Pragma-Dialectics and the Function of Argumentation. Argumentation 24: 41-69.

Siegel, H. and Biro, J (1997). Epistemic Normativity, Argumentation, and Fallacies. Argumentation 11:277-292.

Van Eemeren, F. H. van, and R. Grootendorst (2004). A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The Pragma-dialectical Approach. Cambridge University Press.

Van Eemeren, F.H., Garssen, B., Krabbe, E.C.W., Snoeck Henkemans, F.A., Verheij, B., Wagemans, J.H.M. (2014). Handbook of Argumentation Theory. Springer Netherlands

Woods, J. (2000). How Philosophical is Informal Logic?. Informal Logic , 20 (2), 139 167.

Zenker, F. (2007). Changes in Conduct-rules and Ten Commandments: Pragma-dialectics 1984 vs. 2004. F. H. van Eemeren (ed.), Proceedings of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA) Amsterdam 2006. 1581-1589.